Norm and Normality, Starting from Merleau-Ponty by Spina, Marco
abstract
keywords
merleau-Ponty, normality, normativity, origin and structure of norm, judgement on normality
The present work pursues two main objectives. The first is to pinpoint, by means of a 
series of philosophical arguments, the meaning of the word “norm” and, specifically, to 
explain the tension between normality and normativity in detail. The second, closely 
related to the former, hinges on merleau-Ponty’s personality, and aims at putting the 
“space” of the norm and the key notion of normality in a new form, starting from some 
essential elements of his writing. This effort is particularly significant in the structure 
of Behavior, Phenomenology of Perception and in the Primacy of Perception and 
its Philosophical consequences. 






the starting point for our dissections is an essay entitled normalité et normativité. 
entre phénoménologie et structuralisme, written by Bernhard Waldenfels, one of the 
most important living exponents of phenomenology. in this essay Waldenfels 
discusses the question of the norm on the basis of the pair normal/normativity:
le terme “norme” originariament destiné à dénoter un instrument de mesure, 
un cordeau ou une équerre dont se sert l’architecte, se divise en “normalité” et 
“normativité”. les deux termes se ressemblent fortement, comment peut-on 
alors expliquer leur différence? depuis hume ou Kant, on tend à concevoir la 
normalité comme un complexe de règles descriptives, et la normativité comme 
un complexe de règles presciptives. les unes portent sur des questions de fait, 
les autres sur des questions de droit. le comportement humain est soumis aux 
deux dimensions: normalité et normativité (Waldenfels 2005)1.
in Waldenfels’s opinion, such an alleged antinomy between normality 
and normativity succumbs to two serious failings. The first concerns the 
incarnation of the norms, the second concerns their genesis. on the one hand, 
what is omitted is the entrenchment of each norm in the world of life: the 
norms become incarnated as habits, usages, and customs. What comes out is 
consequently not assessed as right or wrong, good or bad, functional or not 
functional, but as convenient or inconvenient. on the other hand, what is 
left out is the fact that norms cannot exist unless they have been learned and 
appropriated, and that they therefore originate through a genesis revealing 
itself, to some extent, as an event of Stiftung (foundation), even if the latter 
settles into a pre-history of which no trace can be found anymore. 
a similar position is presented by norberto Bobbio, notably in his 
formulation of the entry Judicial norm in Bompiani encyclopedia of 1964, 
where the italian philosopher of law describes the relationship between the 
categories of judicial normativity and of normality as follows:
Del significato comune di “norma”, come del resto di “regola”, sono elementi 
1 “the term ‘norm’ originally denotes a measuring instrument, such as the cord or the 
square that is used by architects. the ‘norm’ is divided in both ‘normality’ and ‘normativity’. 
these two are very similar. so what are the differences between them? Following hume and 
Kant, normality is conceived as a plethora of descriptive rules, and normativity as a complex 
of prescriptive rules. the descriptive rules lead to questions of fact, whereas the prescripted 
ones lead to questions of law. human behavior is subject to two dimensions: normality and 
normativity”.
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caratteristici, rispetto alla funzione, il fine prescrittivo (donde viene l’aggettivo 
“normativo”); rispetto al contenuto, la tipicità del comportamento (donde 
viene l’aggettivo “normale”). una norma è, si potrebbe dire, una proposizione 
normativa che tende a riconoscere e stabilire un comportamento normale: il 
carattere della normatività riguarda il fine, quello della normalità il risultato 
(Bobbio 1994)2.
even if a distinction is made between normative--all that relates to the 
purpose of the norm--and normal--all that concerns the content and the 
effect of the norm--in Bobbio’s definition the relationship between the 
categories of normal and of normative is manifest: every judicial norm 
“tends to identify and establish a normal behaviour”. therefore, every 
norm seems to imply a normality, pre-existing and giving legitimacy to 
the same norm: the normativity of the normal. likewise, every norm sets 
the conditions of normality, “normalizing” the receivers’ behaviours: 
the normality of the normative. nonetheless, a problem arises from this 
context.
normality is one of the most difficult-to-define and most polyhedric of 
concepts, and certainly one among those which have given rise to the 
most heated debates. it is a tricky and ambiguous notion, surrounded by 
an aura of social dangerousness, because it can easily spread pressures, 
inhibitions, and discrimination within a community. the fact that in the 
deconstructionist and post-modern ambit the pluralistic perspectivism 
of “discursive formation” and language games has prevailed over “meta-
narratives” and over the establishments made of universal and eternal 
truths, has progressively led to condemnations and attempts at total 
elimination of the concept of normality, meant as an instrument of power 
and of oppression, of the institutional and established power - the ruling 
class - and as the different, the dissident, the other (Foucault 1970; 
lyotard 1984). 
on the contrary, everyday language has continued to resort to 
substantives and adjectives referring to normality, being evidently 
legitimated by the existence in the common view of the world of 
something matching the notion of normality, beyond any theorization 
and ideology. 
referring to language as the legitimating foundation of normality may 
2  “the common understanding of ‘norm’ and ‘rule’ is characterized by prescription regarding 
its function (from where the adjective ‘normative’ derives), and by the typicality of the behavior 
regarding its content (from where the adjective ‘normal” derives). one could say that ‘norm’ 
must be intended as a normative proposition that tends to recognize and establish a normal 
behavior: normativity is linked to its aim; normality pertains to its result”.
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seem quite risky because of the imprecision and ambiguities its use 
reveals. the adjective normal and the substantive norm, from which the 
former comes, have, in different contexts and perspectives, completely 
different meanings. in italian, for instance, the word norm shifts from 
the most settled use, namely the ethical and juridical one as rule, to the 
medical one as physiological standard meaning, e.g., “to be up to/below 
standard”, to the social one as usage and custom. the adjective normal 
wavers in a wide semantic range, according to the context in which it is 
used, as synonymous with clear, logical, right, habitual, coherent, customary, 
usual, common, and natural. nonetheless, beneath this multivalence it is 
possible to trace a common characteristic of the different meanings, all 
together describing an attitude clearly based on a mutual and shared logic, 
which occurs almost regularly. 
the concept of normality concerns the behavioural relationship between 
the subject and the environment, or rather between the subject and 
the world, and in the subject-world polarity the norm that determines 
normality takes shape.
therefore, it can be supposed that the problem of normality and of its 
elusiveness lies concealed in the subject-world dualism that derives from 
the dualism of the cartesian subject. as a consequence, it is necessary 
to reconsider the concept of normality on the basis of the supersession 
of the cartesian dualism and on the basis of a notion that reintegrates 
the subject and the world into an organic whole and redefines them 
in relation to one another. in considering all of this, light will be cast 
on some themes of merleau-Ponty’s thought, pointing out their salient 
characteristics, to find the necessary elements to answer to the question 
we have hereby raised: what is a norm? What is normality? in what way 
can we talk about it?
leaving aside for the moment the observations made by merleau-
Ponty in The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of Perception, it is 
important to focus in the first place on another crucial passage of his 
work, thus making the questions we are discussing come out even more 
drastically. 
on november 23, 1946, merleau-Ponty gave a lecture at the Société 
française de Philosophie, wherein he illustrated the outcomes described in 
Phenomenology of Perception, which he had published the year before. the 
text of this report, together with the transcript of the heated debate it 
sparked, was later published under the title The Primacy of Perception and 
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the thesis of merleau-Ponty is firm: “the perceived world is always the 
presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value, and all existence. 
this thesis does not destroy either rationality or the absolute. it only 
tries to bring them down to earth” (merleau-Ponty 1964, 13).
it is a thesis which is even more relevant now than it was at that time. What 
is at stake is a kind of philosophy which is able to relate that which is human 
without relinquishing what makes him human, namely “rationality and the 
absolute”. this really is a current matter for at least two reasons. 
on the one hand, because the naturalism of cognitive science and 
biotechnology has really tried to “bring” the human being “down to 
earth”, but at the price of stripping him of everything that makes him 
human. according to classical cognitive science, in fact, thought is an 
immaterial and abstract calculation, while according to biotechnologies 
it is some kind of effect resulting from the human genome. in both the 
cases, it is manifest that no space is left for the human, at least as it has 
been conceived from the greek age until now.
on the other hand, the lecture of merleau-Ponty is useful since 
it perfectly depicts the problems each materialism has posed: its 
formulation, in and of itself, shows it clearly when taking on the strange 
task of “bringing” the human world “down to earth”. now, such a 
demand can be put forward only if it is believed that that world, itself, 
would f loat and be unrelated to real life. in merleau-Ponty’s opinion it 
is precisely so: the human world needs a foundation and this foundation 
cannot be other than “the perceived world”, the world of body and 
of its senses. “We can only think the world because we have already 
experienced it; it is through this experience that we have the idea of 
being, and it is through this experience that the words ‘rational’ and 
‘real’ receive a sense simultaneously” (merleau-Ponty 1964, 17).
the statements by merleau-Ponty, anyway, face an apparently 
insuperable problem: if my body is the basis and the unit of 
measurement of my experiences, and contrariwise your body is the 
basis and the unit of measurement of your experiences, how can we 
succeed in creating a common world where we can meet, discuss, 
produce science, etc., if science, ethics and everyday experience assume 
the existence of a common and collective world, the existence of an 
objective world? 
it is exactly what one of the participants in merleau-Ponty’s lecture, 
Bréhier, commented on from an ethical point of view: “the other is 
‘reciprocable to me’ by reason of a universal norm. Where is your 
norm?” (merleau-Ponty 1964, 31). to be able to consider the other as 
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someone having his own rights, as someone whose point of view is as 
valid as mine, i have to manage to detach myself from my body and to 
think of my perspective as equal to his within a universal and objective 
norm, which is neither mine nor his. how does merleau-Ponty reply 
to this criticism? depreciating the universality of the norm in the 
relativism of the norms: “there is no given universality; there is only a 
presumptive universality” (merleau-Ponty 1964, 31). 
the fact that the norm can change and sometimes indeed has to change 
does not mean that a norm cannot be objective; a subjective norm is no 
more a norm. But if it is objective, how can it find its foundation in a 
subjective body?
From this question, you can get to the bottom of merleau-Ponty’s works.
The definition of the subject and of his relation with the world is gradually 
developed in merleau-Ponty’s works, through many phases which follow 
each other, overlap, and merge into one other. 
The first phase is closely related to the influence of K. Goldstein. Goldstein’s 
studies on subjects affected by neuromotor disorders highlight a unitary 
system of distinction with progressive levels of disintegration of the 
behaviour within an organism conceived as a living totality (structure) 
inseparable from its environment. In this perspective, disease is defined 
as loss of liberty with respect to the environment, impotence in escaping 
from fortuitous circumstances and from their drives, and, consequently, in 
projecting oneself into the future. 
in The Structure of Behaviour goldstein’s themes cross with husserl’s 
phenomenology and with gestaltpsychologie. the criticism of husserl’s 
pure consciousness and absolute subjectivity, based on the irreducibility 
of body, leads merleau-Ponty to reformulate the consciousness-world 
relation starting from corporeality and perception, meant as the initial 
relationship between consciousness and the world, beyond the antithesis 
between idealism and empiricism. merleau-Ponty’s analysis goes beyond 
the subject-world couple to consider behaviour as the initial unitary 
phenomenon where the subject and the world are continuously grasped one 
after the other. The Gestalt influence allows him to formulate a definition 
of behaviour as structure; in other words, as a totality equipped with an 
internal principle of diversification. 
Behaviour as structure varies according to its belonging to the organic or 
the inorganic world, on the basis of a different normative structure which is 
somehow its essence. In such an ambit, Merleau-Ponty enunciates two definitions 
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as the essence of the species, namely as a system of personal constants, which 
express the ideal conditions of relationship to the environment and of activity: 
an experienced norm which corresponds to one’s own being. the second one 
reads the norm as the biological a priori of an individual: “by ‘norm’ here one does 
not mean a ‘should be’ which world make it be, it is the simple observation of a 
preferred attitude statistically more frequent, which gives a new kind of unity to 
behavior” (merleau-Ponty 1963, 159).
in The Structure of Behaviour the concept of norm is meant as the structure 
by means of which the behavioural constants of an organism appear to 
an observer. or, in goldstein’s words, the norm is the structure; in husserl’s 
words, the norm is the style of behaviour. as a result, it can be asserted 
that the perception and the observation of a subject “X” have to reveal the 
structure of his behaviour, that is, his norm. in phenomenological terms, 
it may be defined as some kind of eidetic reduction: in this sense it can be 
maintained that the norm of behaviour of “X” is the essence of “X”, caught 
through perception and based on the certainty of the cognitive act, whose 
actuality is direct. anyway, it is important to specify that it is not only 
defining the norm of “X” but the norm of his behaviour, according to a 
course already followed by Jaspers, Binswanger and minkowsky.
This means that the norm, far from being an abstract, fixed and immutable 
behavioural parameter, takes on its sense only in connection with a 
“ground”, that is to say, with an environmental condition, and defines the 
best adaptation possible of man to the environment and, consequently, his 
ideal living conditions. Then, the fulfilment of the norm should lead to a 
satisfying relationship with the environment and to the adoption of the so-
called--by goldstein--“privileged behaviours”. 
to the extent that human behaviour is characterized by the supremacy 
of the symbolic form--which organizes and involves the other forms in its 
dialectic, thus giving them peculiar sense and significance--its particular 
way of being in the world is essentially marked by transcendence. the norm 
of human behaviour, in fact, does not consist in merely searching for a stable 
equilibrium with the environment. rather it is, indeed, seeking for something 
which still is not, for some kind of striving for the virtual, for an effort which 
is at the same time power of denial and transformation of the real, and which 
is vehiculated by a symbolizing and conceptualising power, going hand-in-
hand with the integration of spiritual activity with corporal activity. 
This initial structural definition of norm, transpiring from the pages of the 
first work of Merleau-Ponty, finds a better and more extensive elaboration in 
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analysis of perception puts the pre-reflective aspect of the existence into 
the foreground, thus localizing the latter in a broader behavioural norm 
including both the dialectic of forms, so the body-soul integration, and the 
world-consciousness-work dialectic, which, in The Structure of Behaviour, is 
considered as a privileged behaviour of man. as a result, the norm, far from 
disregarding its structural characteristic, starts out to become the essential 
structure appropriate to embrace the whole variety of the erlebnisse, on the 
general ground of being-in-the-world. let us have a look at this more closely.
the common feature of the pathological behaviours examined by merleau-
Ponty is the loss of the categorial function, namely, in a few words, the 
loss of the symbolic-virtual openness to the world. in this case the subject 
has shrunk away and positioned himself on a private behavioural norm 
of a “minority” kind, where the structure of transcendence is blocked or 
invalidated. this means that the whole “capability of disposing of a past, a 
present, and a future” is nullified, that is to say, that the transcendence of 
the empirical subject to the world is stricken, together with all the essential 
structures relating to it: intentionality, perception, cogito, it’s own pre-
history as open and retrievable control over body workability.  
Basically, next to the temporality-transcendence, the very essence of the 
subject has been hit, which leads us to conclude that temporality is the 
fundamental norm of human behaviour and is defined as temporal style, and 
that normality consists in human behaviour taking place according to the 
structure of temporality. 
the “normal” disposal of temporality means offers of chances, multiplicity 
of worlds and of horizons, and fluent integration of the past with the future 
in a present which is the operational grip of a body exactly on the world. 
The block of temporality thus signifies the destructuring of the present, 
not a pure and simple blockage of the future, as suggested by minkowsky, 
but the sticking of existence to a behavioural arrangement which cannot 
be defined as normal in any way and whose most essential feature is being 
apraxic. the normal subject in his deep structure is, as we are attempting 
to demonstrate, an i can, namely an active subject, mainly defined by a 
working intentionality and a pragmatic openness. in this sense a behaviour 
being chronically apraxic must be considered far from the style of the 
normal behaviour. moreover, further to the disgregation of temporality, a 
destructuring of personality and a fragmentation of the subject occur. 
assuming the temporal style of existence as norm generates a structural 
notion of norm, which does not determine the content of the behaviour but 
its how. set down like so, the norm can govern the individual-environment 
relationship, in each variation in its own terms, without having a specific 
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content, and can express the sense organising at the same time the life of 
a species, of a collectivity or of a single man, all of them being structures. 
through this perspective, the question of the temporality of the norm has to 
be coped with, wondering if it is eternal and immutable or historic. 
the norm, devoid of content, invariable in its expressions of the temporality 
of the subject, on each occasion takes on the content required by the 
situation. so it is what changes, even though always remaining the same. 
What varies is the way in which behaviour expresses the norm, this relation 
defining the normality. The norm is therefore atemporal, it being structure. 
nevertheless, since it also conveys the sense of a behaviour, the norm cannot 
dodge the reference to the fortuitous situation in which this sense expresses 
itself and the relation such a sense has with the general sense of the world. 
normality in this meaning is outlined according to the ambiguous aspect of 
temporality, as intersection of what is historic and what is atemporal, thus 
defining two axes of normality: the first (atemporal) is one of individual 
disposal of temporality; the second (historic) is one of articulation of the 
sense of the individual behaviour within the general sense of the world, one 
of the gears of individual time in collective time. the latter makes us refer 
to the inter-subjective dimension and to the central question of normality. 
Every subjective paradigm of normality has to find confirmation in the 
intersubjective dimension, as in the same way the individual norm cannot 
be flattened into the environmental norm. The judgement of normality is at 
the same time judgement of the individual on himself and judgement of the 
other on the individual, articulated synchronically and diachronically. 
Particularly on this last topic we can observe that as a matter of fact, 
following the pathway of merleau-Ponty more closely, it can be noticed 
that the supersession of the cartesian subject based on the notion of 
body precisely opens at once, according to the author, an intersubjective 
dimension which leaves out any sort of solipsism. man finds himself, 
among other men, as already given in the world, and his perception 
discovers typicalities similar to his ones. subjects set up, with one 
another, a working knowledge, where a common way of experiencing the 
world is expressed. communication is behavioural and is immediately 
understood by the perception of the others.
The body of the other, by virtue of its symbolizing power, is significant and 
reveals itself as a cultural object, and it is just for this reason that perception 
can perform an intentional transgression with regard to it, thus avoiding 
intellectual mediation and thereby winning access to the sphere of the other. 
the intersubjective relationship has always lain in an interworld, it being the 
2.3 
Experience and 
Judgment of the 
Normality
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place of meeting of two ipseities that disclose themselves in a reciprocity of 
styles, rhythms, and time. said reciprocity is not an absolute transparency, 
but an initial possibility of communication and immediate understanding, on 
which the possibility of speech and dialogue itself is based.
the relation between ego and alter-ego bursts on the scene of the common 
world, where both have always been involved and have always met, and 
demands a necessary character. this is a physical and social world, full of 
collective cultural meanings in which anyone can cooperate in creating and 
destroying. in this socio-cultural world, which is man’s “natural” world, 
non-material beings can be found. said beings originate in the interworld as 
world validities having a universal value and which, belonging to the they, go 
beyond the individual in space and time and preconsciously live with him as 
modes of (co)existence. 
in this ground of settled and experienced validities, the subject’s 
evaluative and interpretative approach, from which he derives his 
parameters and his legitimacy of judgement, has put down its roots. 
and it is right on this ground that the question of normality has to be 
brought back and placed, if the ambiguities that usually characterize 
it are to be extirpated. every objective definition of normality is given 
as ambiguous and paradoxical, due to the fact that its parameter is 
the world’s pre-logical logos, materialized in the they and not in the 
commensurate evaluations of any science. 
The normal is the pre-reflective and normality, thought as pre-reflectivity, 
cannot be caught by means of the scientific objectifying instruments of 
thought, but it manifests itself surrounded by an aura of ambiguity in the 
first step of perception. This perception is not an arbitrary intuition.
one’s own personal history as experience, the history of the other as 
behaviour, and the social history as typical of the human behaviour converge 
in the perception of normality and are grafted onto the validity of the 
normality as an intersubjectively-determined value.
Perception throws open for us the door onto the existence of the other 
through his body; what the abnormal individual expresses through his 
behaviour is his constraint in a private world and his impossibility of 
communication, whereas his body openly communicates what he would 
rather not reveal. Who stands in front of us is not the inhabitant of 
an unknown world, but an exile from our world. his own existence is 
globally connoted by a kind of suffering which has nothing in common 
with the ordinary trials we are used to feeling, even thought in their 
worst forms; it is a radical and incommunicable suffering. such suffering 
is incommunicable, but not totally incomprehensible from the outside. 
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the possibility of understanding an abnormal form of existence is left 
open by the common world foundation, which binds individuals together, 
and by the willingness to “get in the game” and take on the “centrifugal” 
norm of the abnormal behaviour. this possibility of getting in the 
game does not disconcert my being in the world. an abnormal form of 
existence cannot put our world at stake completely, since it represents 
but a minority form. rather, when we get in the game to understand this 
form of passing existence, we reassert our possibility of transcending its 
constraint. 
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